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Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms Races? *
Author(s) -
Collier Paul,
Hoeffler Anke
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
oxford bulletin of economics and statistics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.131
H-Index - 73
eISSN - 1468-0084
pISSN - 0305-9049
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0084.2006.00439.x
Subject(s) - arms race , economics , public spending , deterrence theory , public good , public economics , demographic economics , development economics , political science , political economy , politics , microeconomics , law
Using global data for the period 1960–99, we model military expenditure. Neighbours’ military spending and development aid are important determinants of military expenditure. An implication of the model is that there are regional arms races which are fuelled by aid. Potentially, aid is encouraging a ‘regional public bad’. There may, however, be an offsetting public good effect if military spending deters rebellions. In a simultaneous equation model, we find no deterrence effect of spending on the risk of civil war. Hence, there appears to be no regional public good effect offsetting the public bad arising from a neighbourhood arms race.