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MUTUALITY, PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION †
Author(s) -
Ingham Hilary,
Thompson Steve
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
oxford bulletin of economics and statistics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.131
H-Index - 73
eISSN - 1468-0084
pISSN - 0305-9049
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0084.1995.mp57003002.x
Subject(s) - remuneration , executive compensation , compensation (psychology) , set (abstract data type) , contrast (vision) , control (management) , panel data , economics , accounting , business , demographic economics , labour economics , microeconomics , incentive , finance , econometrics , management , psychology , social psychology , computer science , artificial intelligence , programming language
The determinants of CEO compensation within the UK Building Society sector are investigated. Using an unbalanced panel data set for the period 1986–90, we find only weak support for the existence of a positive link between performance and CEO remuneration. In contrast we find age to be an important determinant of CEO pay increases. This finding reinforces the oft noted potential for inefficiencies in mutuals. Given that alternative market based control systems are absent, our results suggests that there is a lack of any mechanism to align owner and manager interests in the UK building societies.