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Moral Luck Defended
Author(s) -
Hanthan
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00869.x
Subject(s) - luck , philosophy , moral philosophy , citation , epistemology , law , political science
Moral luck occurs when someone’s moral standing is affected by factors beyond her control, i.e., “luck.” Many philosophers reject moral luck. I don’t. I think there’s lots of it.2 Here, I’ll defend a particular kind of it: circumstantial luck. Circumstantial luck is luck in one’s circumstances that affects one’s moral standing, e.g., luck involving one’s choices and opportunities. I’ll criticize the standard argument against circumstantial luck. Most philosophers I’ll discuss restrict their anti-moral luck claims to claims about responsibility, insisting that degrees of praiseworthiness, blameworthiness, laudability, and culpability can’t be affected by luck in circumstances. So I’ll focus on these properties.3 Rejection of moral luck is motivated by the Control Principle. Dana Nelkin (2008) puts it like this.

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