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Mirror, Mirror in the Brain, What's the Monkey Stand to Gain?
Author(s) -
Allen Colin
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00744.x
Subject(s) - intentionality , mirror neuron , cognitive science , psychology , cognition , cognitive psychology , neuroscience , theory of mind , order (exchange) , neural correlates of consciousness , epistemology , philosophy , finance , economics
Abstract Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher‐order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so‐called “mirror neurons” in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher‐order intentionality, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behavioral studies of humans and monkeys. A decisive resolution to the paradox requires substantial additional empirical work and perhaps a rejection of the standard philosophical view.