A Defense of Stable Invariantism

A true belief and a belief that counts as knowledge can both be practically useful. But the important difference between them, as Plato tells us in the Meno, is that only knowledge has a "tether" so that it cannot run away. The general sense that knowledge is fairly stable has been an enduring part of the epistemological tradition—until recently. Some currently popular views—contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism—have the consequence that whether someone can correctly be said to have knowledge can change abruptly, even when there is no change in her evidence or reliability. These views are embraced in large part because they are thought to provide solutions to old epistemological problems. But, as I shall argue below, the cure is worse than the disease. The innovative aspects of these views either do not work or undermine our interest in knowledge. A more satisfying view, which I shall call stable invariantism, offers solutions to these problems derived simply from the basic commitment to fallibilism that virtually every epistemologist shares.