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Consciousness is Underived Intentionality
Author(s) -
Bourget David
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00730.x
Subject(s) - intentionality , philosophy of mind , consciousness , philosophy , holism , epistemology , quine , functionalism (philosophy of mind) , philosophy of science , cognitive science , psychology , metaphysics
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: they are under- ived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived in- tentional states are phenomenal states. I clarify these claims and argue for each of them. I also address objections which touch on a range of topics, including meaning holism and concept empiricism. I conclude with a brief discussion of the consequences of the proposed view for the project of naturalizing consciousness.