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Why Experience Told Me Nothing about Transparency 1
Author(s) -
Molyneux Bernard
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.01698.x
Subject(s) - transparency (behavior) , nothing , argument (complex analysis) , phenomenon , style (visual arts) , presentation (obstetrics) , epistemology , psychology , computer science , philosophy , computer security , medicine , literature , art , radiology
The transparency argument concludes that we're directly aware of external properties and not directly aware of the properties of experience. Focusing on the presentation used by Michael Tye (2002) I contend that the argument requires experience to have content that it cannot plausibly have. I attribute the failure to a faulty account of the transparency phenomenon and conclude by suggesting an alternative understanding that is independently plausible, is not an error‐theory and yet renders the transparency of experience compatible with mental‐paint style views.