The Determinable‐Determinate Relation

The properties colored and red stand in a special relation. Namely, red is a determinate of colored, and colored is determinable relative to red. Many other properties are similarly related. The determination relation is an interesting topic of logical investigation in its own right, and the prominent philosophical inquiries into this relation have, accordingly, operated at a high level of abstraction. 1 It is time to return to these investigations, not just as a logical amusement, but for the payoffs such investigation can yield in solving some basic metaphysical problems. The goal in what follows is twofold. First, I argue for a novel understanding of the determination relation. Second, this understanding is applied to yield insights into property instance (e.g., trope) individuation, how different property types can share an instance, the relation between property types and property instances, as well as applications to causation (mental causation, in particular). The determination relation holds between property types. A successful analysis of this relation should accord with the following truisms about determinables and their determinates: 1. The following canonical pairs must turn out to be related as determinable to determinate: colored/red, red/scarlet, and shaped/circular. The first two examples show that properties are determinables or determinates only relative to other properties. Red is determinable relative to scarlet, but determinate relative to colored. 2. For an object to have a determinate property is for that object to have the determinable properties the determinate falls under in a specific way. For example, being scarlet is a specific way of being red, and being red is a specific way of being colored. This notion of specificity with regard to