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Is Mental Content Prior to Linguistic Meaning?
Author(s) -
Speaks Jeff
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00619.x
Subject(s) - meaning (existential) , citation , content (measure theory) , linguistics , original meaning , computer science , psychology , library science , philosophy , mathematics , psychotherapist , mathematical analysis
Most contemporary work on the nature of intentionality proceeds from the thesis that the fundamental sort of representation is mental representation. The purpose of this essay is to argue that, to a large extent, this starting point is mistaken. A clear view of some of the phenomena with which the philosophies of language and mind are centrally concerned—including the nature of mental content and linguistic meaning—requires taking seriously the idea that public languages can and often do serve as a vehicle for the thoughts of agents. The picture of intentionality which informs most contemporary work on mental and linguistic representation may be brought out by considering three questions. First, there is a question about the relation between thought and language, namely