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Logic, Models, and Paradoxical Inferences
Author(s) -
ORENES ISABEL,
JOHNSONLAIRD P. N.
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01448.x
Subject(s) - premise , psychology , epistemology , cognitive psychology , philosophy
People reject ‘paradoxical’ inferences, such as: Luisa didn't play music; therefore, if Luisa played soccer, then she didn't play music . For some theorists, they are invalid for everyday conditionals, but valid in logic. The theory of mental models implies that they are valid, but unacceptable because the conclusion refers to a possibility inconsistent with the premise. Hence, individuals should accept them if the conclusions refer only to possibilities consistent with the premises: Luisa didn't play soccer; therefore, if Luisa played a game then she didn't play soccer . Two experiments corroborated this prediction for three sorts of ‘paradox’, including a disjunctive paradox.