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A Causal Model of Intentionality Judgment
Author(s) -
SLOMAN STEVEN A.,
FERNBACH PHILIP M.,
EWING SCOTT
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01439.x
Subject(s) - intentionality , psychology , action (physics) , inference , cognitive psychology , epistemology , experimental philosophy , causal inference , causal model , cognitive science , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics , economics , econometrics , medicine , western philosophy , pathology
We propose a causal model theory to explain asymmetries in judgments of the intentionality of a foreseen side‐effect that is either negative or positive (Knobe, 2003). The theory is implemented as a Bayesian network relating types of mental states, actions, and consequences that integrates previous hypotheses. It appeals to two inferential routes to judgment about the intentionality of someone else's action: bottom‐up from action to desire and top‐down from character and disposition. Support for the theory comes from three experiments that test the prediction that bottom‐up inference should occur only when the actor's primary objective is known. The model fits intentionality judgments reasonably well with no free parameters.