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Reply to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz
Author(s) -
MACHERY EDOUARD
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01406.x
Subject(s) - epistemology , argument (complex analysis) , empiricism , philosophy , term (time) , psychology , biochemistry , chemistry , physics , quantum mechanics
In this response to Malt's and Prinz's commentaries, I argue that neo‐empiricist hypotheses fail to threaten the argument for the elimination of ‘concept’ because they are unlikely to be true of all concepts, if they are true at all. I also defend the hypothesis that we possess bodies of knowledge retrieved by default from long‐term memory, and I argue that prototypes, exemplars, and theories form genuinely distinct concepts.