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Moral Nativism: A Sceptical Response
Author(s) -
STERELNY KIM
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01390.x
Subject(s) - psychological nativism , cognition , psychology , skepticism , normative , cognitive science , moral disengagement , judgement , moral psychology , social cognitive theory of morality , epistemology , cognitive psychology , social psychology , philosophy , immigration , archaeology , neuroscience , history
In the last few years, nativist, modular views of moral cognition have been influential. This paper shares the view that normative cognition develops robustly, and is probably an adaptation. But it develops an alternative view of the developmental basis of moral cognition, based on the idea that adults scaffold moral development by organising the learning environment of the next generation. In addition, I argue that the modular nativist picture has no plausible account of the role of explicit moral judgement, and that no persuasive version of the ‘poverty of the stimulus' applies to moral cognition.