Premium
Demonstrative Thought
Author(s) -
LEVINE JOSEPH
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01385.x
Subject(s) - demonstrative , referent , object (grammar) , representation (politics) , property (philosophy) , relation (database) , mediation , linguistics , perception , psychology , computer science , cognitive science , epistemology , philosophy , sociology , political science , social science , database , politics , law
In this paper I propose a model of demonstrative thought. I distinguish token‐demonstratives, that pick out individuals, from type‐demonstratives, that pick out kinds, or properties, and provide a similar treatment for both. I argue that it follows from my model of demonstrative thought, as well as from independent considerations, that demonstration, as a mental act, operates directly on mental representations, not external objects. That is, though the relation between a demonstrative and the object or property demonstrated is semantically direct, the mechanism by which a demonstrative acquires its referent involves mediation by a perceptual representation. Finally, I argue that so‐called ‘demonstrative concepts'—which I treat as type‐demonstratives—cannot perform the various philosophical functions that have been assigned to them.