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Thought Insertion and Self‐Knowledge
Author(s) -
FERNÁNDEZ JORDI
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01381.x
Subject(s) - psychology , epistemology , self knowledge , cognitive psychology , feature (linguistics) , social psychology , philosophy , linguistics
I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self‐knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self‐knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way.