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Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States
Author(s) -
GREEN MITCHELL S.
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01357.x
Subject(s) - expression (computer science) , sincerity , assertion , utterance , regret , psychology , state (computer science) , feeling , feature (linguistics) , speech act , epistemology , linguistics , cognitive science , social psychology , philosophy , computer science , algorithm , machine learning , programming language
One oft‐cited feature of speech acts is their expressive character: Assertion expresses belief, apology regret, promise intention. Yet expression, or at least sincere expression, is as I argue a form of showing: A sincere expression shows whatever is the state that is the sincerity condition of the expressive act. How, then, can a speech act show a speaker’s state of thought or feeling? To answer this question I consider three varieties of showing, and argue that only one of them is suited to help us answer our question. I also argue that concepts from the evolutionary biology of communication provide one source of insight into how speech acts enable one to show, and thereby express, a psychological state.