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The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues
Author(s) -
MACHERY EDOUARD
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00336.x
Subject(s) - epistemology , interpretation (philosophy) , experimental philosophy , action (physics) , psychology , folk psychology , philosophy , linguistics , philosophical methodology , physics , quantum mechanics
Recent experimental findings by Knobe and others (Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the significance of these findings has been overstated. My discussion is two‐pronged. First, I contend that barring a consensual theory of conceptual competence, the significance of these experimental findings for the nature of the concept of intentional action cannot be determined. Unfortunately, the lack of progress in the philosophy of concepts casts doubt on whether such a consensual theory will be found. Second, I propose a new, deflationary interpretation of these experimental findings, ‘the trade‐off hypothesis’, and I present several new experimental findings that support this interpretation.