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Unnatural Epistemology
Author(s) -
GREENWOOD JOHN D.
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00303.x
Subject(s) - ascription , epistemology , ostensive definition , philosophy of mind , introspection , meaning (existential) , folk psychology , philosophy of science , theory of mind , mental state , psychology , philosophy , metaphysics , cognitive science , cognition , neuroscience
‘Naturalized’ philosophers of mind regularly appeal to the empirical psychological literature in support of the ‘theory‐theory’ account of the natural epistemology of mental state ascription (to self and others). It is argued that such appeals are not philosophically neutral, but in fact presuppose the theory‐theory account of mental state ascription. It is suggested that a possible explanation of the popularity of the theory‐theory account is that it is generally assumed that alternative accounts in terms of introspection (and simulation) presuppose a discredited ‘inner ostensive definition’ account of the meaning of mental state terms. However, the inner ostensive definition account is not the only alternative to the theory‐theory account of the meaning of mental state terms, and commitment to a theory‐theory account of the meaning of mental state terms does not mandate commitment to a theory‐theory account of the epistemology of mental state ascription.