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Apperception, Sensation, and Dissociability
Author(s) -
ROSENTHAL DAVID M.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00071.x
Subject(s) - apperception , citation , cognitive science , psychology , center (category theory) , library science , computer science , cognitive psychology , chemistry , crystallography
Recent writing on consciousness has increasingly stressed ways in which the terms ‘conscious’ and ‘consciousness’ apply to more than one phenomenon. And it is often urged that failing to observe distinctions between these different phenomena results in fallacious argument and theoretical confusion. Perhaps the most widely discussed current example is Ned Block’s (1990, 1992, 1993, 1995) distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, and his claim that discussions of consciousness frequently confound the two phenomena. And elsewhere I have urged the importance of distinguishing a mental state’s being conscious from a person’s being conscious, and also of distinguishing a mental state’s being conscious from one’s being conscious of something. 1