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Can We Believe What We Do Not Understand?
Author(s) -
RECANATI FRANÇOIS
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00063.x
Subject(s) - epistemology , belief revision , representation (politics) , phenomenon , psychology , cognitive science , philosophy , cognitive psychology , politics , political science , law
In a series of papers, Sperber provides the following analysis of the phenomenon of ill‐understood belief (or ‘quasi‐belief’, as I call it): (i) the quasi‐believer has a validating meta‐belief, to the effect that a certain representation is true; yet (ii) that representation does not give rise to a plain belief, because it is ‘semi‐propositional’. In this paper I discuss several aspects of this treatment. In particular, I deny that the representation accepted by the quasi‐believer is semantically indeterminate, and I reject Sperber's claim that quasi‐belief is a credal attitude distinct from plain belief.