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Boghossian on Reductive Dispositionalism About Content: The Case Strengthened
Author(s) -
MILLER ALEXANDER
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00059.x
Subject(s) - reductionism , philosophy , epistemology , content (measure theory) , mathematics , mathematical analysis
Paul Boghossian has recently argued against reductive dispositionalism concerning mental content. However, there is a powerful version of reductive dispositionalism—based on work by Ramsey and Lewis—that Boghossian does not consider. In this paper I argue that Boghossian's arguments can be adapted to apply even to this stronger version of reductionism.