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Fregean Innocence
Author(s) -
PIETROSKI PAUL M.
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00051.x
Subject(s) - principle of compositionality , expression (computer science) , sentence , value (mathematics) , linguistics , philosophy , semantics (computer science) , innocence , point (geometry) , epistemology , computer science , psychology , mathematics , programming language , psychoanalysis , geometry , machine learning
Frege's account of opacity is based on two attractive ideas: every meaningful expression has a sense ( Sinn ) that determines the expression's semantic value ( Bedeutung ); and the semantic value of a‘that’‐clause is the thought expressed by its embedded sentence. Considerations of compositionality led Frege to a more problematic view: inside ‘that’‐clauses, an expression does not have its customary Bedeutung. But contrary to initial appearances, compositionality does not entail a familiar substitutivity principle. And Fregeans can exploit this point in a way that lets them reject Bedeutung ‐shifting.