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The Prospects for Dretske's Account of the Explanatory Role of Belief
Author(s) -
MELNYK ANDREW
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00041.x
Subject(s) - epistemology , relevance (law) , counterexample , content (measure theory) , virtue , philosophy , mathematics , law , mathematical analysis , discrete mathematics , political science
When a belief is cited as part of the explanation of an agent's behaviour, it seems that the belief is explanatorily relevant in virtue of its content. In his Explaining Behavior , Dretske presents an account of belief, content, and explanation according to which this can be so. I supply some examples of beliefs whose explanatory relevance in virtue of content apparently cannot be accounted for in the Dretskean way. After considering some possible responses to this challenge, I end by discussing how serious these counterexamples are for Dretske's account.