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Notional Specificity
Author(s) -
CRIMMINS MARK
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00025.x
Subject(s) - notional amount , subject (documents) , epistemology , mental representation , security token , psychology , cognitive science , computer science , philosophy , cognition , finance , economics , computer security , neuroscience , library science
I hold that a belief report characterizes the subject's belief not only by its truth conditions, but also by the token mental representations involved in it (based on conversational hints). To what extent does a belief report specify the mental representations required to make it true? I advance two surprising theses: (i) many reports specify representations by actually referring to them, and (ii) it is not clear that any ordinary reports simply leave open what sorts of representations are required for their truth. I defend these claims from the arguments of Marga Reimer and other critics.