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The Language of Thought: No Syntax Without Semantics *
Author(s) -
CRANE TIM
Publication year - 1990
Publication title -
mind and language
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.905
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1468-0017
pISSN - 0268-1064
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1990.tb00159.x
Subject(s) - syntax , citation , semantics (computer science) , cognitive science , linguistics , computer science , philosophy , psychology , library science , programming language
Many philosophers think that being in an intentional state is a matter of being related to a sentence in a mental language-a 'Language of Thought' (see especially Fodor 1975, 1987 Appendix; Field 1978). According to this view-which I shall call 'the LT hypothesis'-when anyone has a belief or a desire or a hope with a certain content, they have a sentence of this language, with that content, 'written' in their heads. The claim is meant quite literally: the mental representations that make up the items of this language have semantic and syntactic properties. This is why, according to this view, cognitive psychology does, and should, treat that part of the mind which deals with intentional states as a semantic and a syntactic 'engine'. Stephen Stich 1983 has argued at length that although there are good reasons for thinking of the mind as a syntactic engine, cognitive psychology should abandon the idea of a semantic engine. In particular, he argues that the 'folk' psychological notion of the semantic content of an intentional state should have no place in a mature science of the mind. He does think that there is a language of thought, but it is a purely syntactic language, a language without semantics. In this paper I will explain why he is wrong. Patricia and Paul Churchland have also attacked the scientific credentials of folk psychology (see P.M. Churchland 1981; P.S. Churchland 1986). But unlike Stich, they do not think that the functionalist idea behind his