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SOCIAL CONFLICT, GROWTH AND FACTOR SHARES
Author(s) -
Tsoukis Christopher,
Tournemaine Frederic
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
metroeconomica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.256
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-999X
pISSN - 0026-1386
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-999x.2010.04107.x
Subject(s) - economics , stackelberg competition , microeconomics , growth model , endogenous growth theory , welfare , factor shares , distribution (mathematics) , human capital , production (economics) , market economy , mathematical analysis , mathematics
Standard growth theory is based on atomistic agents with no strategic interactions among them. In contrast, we model growth as resulting from a one‐off, strategic game between ‘workers’ and owners of capital (‘capitalists’) on factor shares, in an otherwise standard ‘AK’ growth model. The resulting distribution of income between factors further determines the marginal revenue product of capital and the rate of growth. We analyse the properties of four equilibria: competitive, Stackelberg equilibrium, a hybrid non‐cooperative regime and cooperative, in terms of labour shares, growth and welfare. Our model thus endogenizes key aspects of the ‘social contract’.