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NON‐LINEAR PRICING AS A COOPERATIVE GAME
Author(s) -
Andersson Tommy
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
metroeconomica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.256
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-999X
pISSN - 0026-1386
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-999x.2007.00284.x
Subject(s) - transferable utility , core (optical fiber) , mathematical economics , economics , microeconomics , regular polygon , game theory , computer science , mathematics , telecommunications , geometry
ABSTRACT This paper characterizes non‐linear outlay schedules that are based on a cooperative surplus‐sharing game with transferable utility. First, the pricing game is shown to be convex and, as a consequence, to have a non‐empty core. This is followed by a description of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the envy‐free core to be non‐empty.