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EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES
Author(s) -
Fischer Sven,
Güth Werner,
Pull Kerstin
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
metroeconomica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.256
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-999X
pISSN - 0026-1386
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-999x.2007.00269.x
Subject(s) - commit , economics , microeconomics , imperfect , ultimatum game , bargaining power , neglect , set (abstract data type) , bargaining problem , power (physics) , mathematical economics , psychology , computer science , linguistics , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics , database , psychiatry , programming language
To commit in bargaining is crucial: in the ultimatum game with its one‐sided commitment power the ‘proposer’ (almost) receives the whole pie while the ‘responder’ is left with (almost) nothing. When bargaining parties commit simultaneously the symmetric Nash ( Econometrica , 1950, vol. 18, pp. 155–162) bargaining solution predicts equal shares. Continuously connecting these two games yields a one‐parameter family of games (Fischer et al ., Experimental Economics , 2006, vol. 9, pp. 17–33) for which we distinguish two behavioral dispositions, namely (1) neglecting commitment power and (2) reacting to it strategically. Their pay‐off implications define the evolutionary set‐up for which we derive the evolutionarily stable behavioral disposition. Our analysis sheds light on the hypothesis that in experiments participants neglect strategic aspects such as commitment power.