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Epistemic Norms and Democracy: a Response to Talisse
Author(s) -
Rydenfelt Henrik
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
metaphilosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 35
eISSN - 1467-9973
pISSN - 0026-1068
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01721.x
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , perfectionism (psychology) , democracy , premise , normative , epistemology , dilemma , pragmatism , reading (process) , sociology , philosophy , key (lock) , argumentation theory , political science , law , psychology , social psychology , politics , biochemistry , chemistry , ecology , biology
J ohn R awls argued that democracy must be justifiable to all citizens; otherwise, a democratic society is oppressive to some. In A P ragmatist P hilosophy of D emocracy ([Talisse, Robert B., 2007]), R obert B . T alisse attempts to meet the R awlsian challenge by drawing from C harles S . P eirce's pragmatism. This article first briefly canvasses the argument of T alisse's book and then criticizes its key premise concerning (normative) reasons for belief by offering a competing reading of P eirce's “The F ixation of B elief” ([Peirce, Charles Sanders, 1877]). It then proceeds to argue that T alisse's argument faces a dilemma: his proposal of epistemic perfectionism either is substantive and can be reasonably disagreed about or is minimal but insufficient to ground a democratic society. Consequently, it suggests that the R awlsian challenge can only be solved by abandoning R awls's own notion of reasonableness, and that an interesting alternative notion of reasons can be derived from P eirce's “ F ixation.”