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EVOLUTION, NATURALISM, AND THE WORTHWHILE: A CRITIQUE OF RICHARD JOYCE'S EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING OF MORALITY
Author(s) -
TONER CHRISTOPHER
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
metaphilosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 35
eISSN - 1467-9973
pISSN - 0026-1068
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01710.x
Subject(s) - morality , skepticism , naturalism , epistemology , adaptation (eye) , philosophy , moral psychology , environmental ethics , psychology , neuroscience
In The Evolution of Morality , Richard Joyce argues there is good reason to think that the “moral sense” is a biological adaptation, and that this provides a genealogy of the moral sense that has a debunking effect, driving us to the conclusion that “our moral beliefs are products of a process that is entirely independent of their truth, … we have no grounds one way or the other for maintaining these beliefs.” I argue that Joyce's skeptical conclusion is not warranted. Even if the moral sense is a biological adaptation, developed moralities (such as Aristotelian eudaimonism) can “co‐opt” it into new roles so that the moral judgments it makes possible can come to transcend the evolutionary process that is “entirely independent of their truth.” While evolutionary theory can shed much light on our shared human nature, moral theories must still be vindicated, or debunked, by moral arguments.