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FEELING WITHOUT THINKING: LESSONS FROM THE ANCIENTS ON EMOTION AND VIRTUE‐ACQUISITION
Author(s) -
COPLAN AMY
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
metaphilosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 35
eISSN - 1467-9973
pISSN - 0026-1068
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01626.x
Subject(s) - mirroring , virtue , socrates , intellectualism , epistemology , feeling , psychology , cognition , theory of mind , empirical research , moral psychology , empirical psychology , empirical evidence , cognitive psychology , social psychology , philosophy , philosophy of psychology , neuroscience
By briefly sketching some important ancient accounts of the connections between psychology and moral education, I hope to illuminate the significance of the contemporary debate on the nature of emotion and to reveal its stakes. I begin the essay with a brief discussion of intellectualism in Socrates and the Stoics, and Plato's and Posidonius's respective attacks against it. Next, I examine the two current leading philosophical accounts of emotion: the cognitive theory and the noncognitive theory. I maintain that the noncognitive theory better explains human behavior and experience and has more empirical support than the cognitive theory. In the third section of the essay I argue that recent empirical research on emotional contagion and mirroring processes provides important new evidence for the noncognitive theory. In the final section, I draw some preliminary conclusions about moral education and the acquisition of virtue.