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MORAL REFORM, MORAL DISAGREEMENT, AND ABORTION
Author(s) -
WALLACE KATHLEEN
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
metaphilosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 35
eISSN - 1467-9973
pISSN - 0026-1068
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2007.00499.x
Subject(s) - humility , abortion , action (physics) , moral reasoning , moral disengagement , moral authority , moral psychology , philosophy , epistemology , environmental ethics , sociology , psychology , law , political science , theology , pregnancy , physics , quantum mechanics , biology , genetics
Bernard Gert argues that legitimate moral disagreement calls for tolerance and moral humility; when there is more than one morally acceptable course of action, then intolerance and what Gert calls “moral arrogance” would be objectionable. This article identifies some possible difficulties in distinguishing moral arrogance from moral reform and then examines Gert's treatment of abortion as a contemporary example of moral disagreement that he characterizes as irresolvable.