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RELATIVISM AND NORMATIVE NONREALISM: BASING MORALITY ON RATIONALITY
Author(s) -
CARSON THOMAS L.,
MOSER PAUL K.
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
metaphilosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 35
eISSN - 1467-9973
pISSN - 0026-1068
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9973.1996.tb00207.x
Subject(s) - rationality , normative , internalism and externalism , morality , relativism , epistemology , argument (complex analysis) , principle of rationality , externalism , philosophy , ecological rationality , sociology , chemistry , biochemistry
Normative nonrealism denies (a) that some things are good or bad or right or wrong independently of facts about the attitudes of moral agents, and (b) that attitude‐independent normative facts determine what is rational. An influential nonrealist approach to rationality comes from Richard Brandt's account of rationality in terms of “full information.” Using Brandt's account as illustrative, this paper identifies a serious problem for nonrealist normative theories based on theories of rationality. The paper argues that nonrealist accounts of rationality that oppose relativism cannot successfully handle the most serious threat from relativists: namely, a threat from a ‘Why care?’ open‐question argument that stems from the question why one should care about being rational in a certain respect or sense. The paper identifies the bearing of ‘Why care?’ questions on the conflict between internalism and externalism regarding practical reasons. The main lesson is that ‘Why care?’ questions wreak havoc for nonrelativist nonrealist approaches to rationality and reason‐based morality.