Premium
ON THE SUPERIORITY OF FIXED FEE OVER AUCTION IN TECHNOLOGY LICENSING *
Author(s) -
MIAO CHUNHUI
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
the manchester school
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.361
H-Index - 42
eISSN - 1467-9957
pISSN - 1463-6786
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02289.x
Subject(s) - innovator , revenue equivalence , microeconomics , economics , revenue , fixed cost , dutch auction , auction theory , business , industrial organization , common value auction , finance , entrepreneurship
In this note, we identify conditions under which a fixed‐fee policy is superior to an auction in technology licensing by an outsider innovator. We find that, even in cases involving a minimum degree of asymmetry among downstream firms, fixed‐fee licensing can generate a strictly higher revenue than an auction, but the same can never be true in cases where issuing multiple licenses is optimal.