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R&D PRODUCTIVITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS *
Author(s) -
POYAGOTHEOTOKY JOANNA,
TEERASUWANNAJAK KHEMARAT TALERNGSRI
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
the manchester school
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.361
H-Index - 42
eISSN - 1467-9957
pISSN - 1463-6786
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02282.x
Subject(s) - productivity , intellectual property , context (archaeology) , duopoly , economics , simple (philosophy) , property rights , field (mathematics) , microeconomics , industrial organization , political science , law , economic growth , geography , cournot competition , mathematics , philosophy , archaeology , epistemology , pure mathematics
We study firms' preferences towards intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes in a North–South context, using a simple duopoly model where a ‘North’ and a ‘South’ firm compete in a third market. Unlike other contributions in this field, we explicitly introduce the South's capability to undertake cost‐reducing R&D, but maintain the South's inferiority in using and managing its R&D. In contrast to traditional results, we show that the North may encourage lax IPR protection provided that its South rival's R&D productivity is not too low. In this sense, our results do not support the idea of universal or uniform IPR protection regime.