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JUST‐IN‐TIME PRODUCTION, WORK ORGANIZATION AND ABSENCE CONTROL
Author(s) -
LANFRANCHI JOSEPH,
TREBLE JOHN
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
the manchester school
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.361
H-Index - 42
eISSN - 1467-9957
pISSN - 1463-6786
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02206.x
Subject(s) - absenteeism , generosity , incentive , production (economics) , sick leave , control (management) , economics , labour economics , work (physics) , value (mathematics) , business , demographic economics , microeconomics , management , mechanical engineering , philosophy , theology , machine learning , computer science , engineering
Studies of sick‐pay and absenteeism have traditionally treated absence as a worker‐related phenomenon. There are good reasons to suppose, though, that firms' incentives to control absenteeism are not uniform. Using an employee/employer‐matched data set, we investigate the relationship between the firm's production methods and the generosity of its sick‐pay. The results suggest that firms that might be expected to value reliability highly, characterized as those that use just‐in‐time, are more likely to provide less generous sick‐pay. Those findings survive when we control for the use of complementary policies that buffer production from absence shocks.