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DO ABATEMENT QUOTAS LEAD TO MORE SUCCESSFUL CLIMATE COALITIONS? *
Author(s) -
ALTAMIRANOCABRERA JUANCARLOS,
FINUS MICHAEL,
DELLINK ROB
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
the manchester school
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.361
H-Index - 42
eISSN - 1467-9957
pISSN - 1463-6786
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01052.x
Subject(s) - unanimity , economics , incentive , voting , treaty , lead (geology) , microeconomics , stability (learning theory) , environmental economics , public economics , international economics , computer science , political science , geomorphology , machine learning , politics , law , geology
In this paper we study the effect of different treaty designs on the success of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We analyze the standard assumption of an efficient abatement scheme and three uniform abatement quota schemes. Apart from analytical results, the analysis is supported by simulations based on the STACO (stability of coalitions) model. It turns out that quota agreements where the members decide by majority or unanimity voting are successful in overcoming free‐rider incentives within an IEA. Finally, our results provide a rationale for the application of uniform abatement quotas in IEAs.