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MULTIDIMENSIONAL SIGNALING IN THE LABOR MARKET
Author(s) -
KIM JEONGYOO
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
the manchester school
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.361
H-Index - 42
eISSN - 1467-9957
pISSN - 1463-6786
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01038.x
Subject(s) - productivity , job market , simple (philosophy) , economics , labour economics , microeconomics , economic growth , work (physics) , engineering , epistemology , mechanical engineering , philosophy
I consider a two‐dimensional job market signaling model in which firms care about a worker's personal network as well as his technical productivity, and a worker can choose both academic activity and social activity to signal his ability. In a simple model where the social activity forming a social network does not require special ability, I show that the Cho–Kreps intuitive criterion singles out Spence's outcome of signaling high academic ability by high education. I also demonstrate the possibility that a worker with high academic ability may underinvest in education when the social ability is correlated with the academic ability.