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MARKET NICHE, FLEXIBILITY AND COMMITMENT *
Author(s) -
BASOV SUREN,
SMIRNOV VLADIMIR,
WAIT ANDREW
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
the manchester school
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.361
H-Index - 42
eISSN - 1467-9957
pISSN - 1463-6786
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01006.x
Subject(s) - iterated function , flexibility (engineering) , outcome (game theory) , economics , microeconomics , industrial organization , market segmentation , business , mathematics , management , mathematical analysis
We study a market‐entry game in which the potential entrants wish to coordinate their actions (i.e. enter different market segments rather than compete directly). If (i) the firms have an option to wait, and (ii) each firm has a different reaction time after they have decided to wait, the unique outcome that survives the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies favors the less flexible firms.