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Corporate Monitorships and New Governance Regulation: In Theory, in Practice, and in Context
Author(s) -
FORD CRISTIE,
HESS DAVID
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
law and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.534
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1467-9930
pISSN - 0265-8240
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00347.x
Subject(s) - corporate governance , context (archaeology) , corporate crime , accounting , government (linguistics) , compliance (psychology) , perspective (graphical) , business , settlement (finance) , law and economics , economics , political science , law , finance , psychology , paleontology , social psychology , linguistics , philosophy , artificial intelligence , computer science , payment , biology
Over the last few years, it has become increasingly common for government agencies to resolve corporate criminal law and securities regulations violations through the use of settlement agreements that require corporations to improve their compliance programs and hire independent monitors to oversee the changes. Based on our interviews with corporate monitors, regulators, and others, we find that these monitorships are failing to meet their full potential in reforming corrupt corporate cultures. After reviewing potential reforms to improve monitorships from a new governance perspective, we discuss the limits of these reforms that are due to the sociological and institutional environment in which monitorships are embedded.