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The Judicial Transformation of the State: The Case of U.S. Trade Policy, 1974–2004
Author(s) -
CHOREV NITSAN
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
law and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.534
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1467-9930
pISSN - 0265-8240
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9930.2008.00284.x
Subject(s) - protectionism , politics , political science , judicial activism , state (computer science) , negotiation , free trade , neoliberalism (international relations) , judicial review , transformation (genetics) , law , economics , law and economics , international trade , algorithm , computer science , biochemistry , chemistry , gene
The recent shift in state policies from Keynesianism to neoliberalism was accompanied by a transformation in state structures. The case of trade liberalization in the United States reveals that this structural transformation is of a judicial nature. In 1974, supporters of free trade successfully shifted authority over the management of protectionist claims from Congress to quasi‐judicial bodies in theU.S. executive; in 1994, they successfully strengthened the dispute settlement mechanisms of the World Trade Organization. This judicial transformation indicates a shift from sites where decisions are made by way of political negotiations to sites where judges preside over legal disputes. In the article, I identify the political origins of these judicial transformations and discuss the factors that make judicial sites more favorable to neoliberal policies than political sites.