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HIDDEN ALLOCATORS: Administrative Law Judges and Regulatory Reform
Author(s) -
MARQUARDT RONALD G.,
WHEAT EDWARD M.
Publication year - 1980
Publication title -
law and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.534
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1467-9930
pISSN - 0265-8240
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9930.1980.tb00226.x
Subject(s) - administrative law , accountability , variety (cybernetics) , politics , government (linguistics) , public administration , law , executive branch , political science , subject (documents) , linguistics , philosophy , artificial intelligence , computer science , library science
The 1132 administrative law judges now serving in twenty‐nine of the most important agencies of the national government are among the least understood and least studied authorities in the American political system, yet they are among the most powerful authorities in the modern policy process. ALJs have undergone a repid development from the creation of the office of “hearing examiner” in the Hepburn Act of 1906 to the rpesent djay, when they hear cases cfomparable in importance to those heard by federal district judges. ALHs are selected through a merit procedure almost wholly controlled by the agencies in which they are employed and are subject to constant cross‐pressures from their judicial role and their administrative masters. Perceived problems of biased selection procedures, conflicts of interest, and lack of public accountability have led critics in Congress and elsewhere to propose a variety of marginal reforms. The policy proposal that probably gets to the heart of the problem, however, is the creation of an Administrative Court of the United States.