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Representativeness and Humanitarian Intervention
Author(s) -
Pattison James
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
journal of social philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.353
H-Index - 31
eISSN - 1467-9833
pISSN - 0047-2786
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2007.00399.x
Subject(s) - representativeness heuristic , citation , intervention (counseling) , sociology , library science , media studies , psychology , computer science , social psychology , psychiatry
Humanitarian intervention involves military action by a state, coalition of states, or multinational organization with the primary purpose of preventing, reducing, or halting a mass violation of basic human rights. It is widely held that humanitarian intervention needs to meet certain criteria in order to be morally justifiable. Most recent discussions of humanitarian intervention focus on the same few criteria, criteria derived from traditional Just War Theory (primarily the rules of jus ad bellum). These include the following. (1) The number of violations of basic human rights is large enough to justify humanitarian intervention. (2) There is a reasonable prospect of successfully tackling the humanitarian crisis. (3) The use of force is the last resort. (4) The intervener is a legitimate authority or has been authorized by a legitimate authority (which is typically taken to mean the United Nations Security Council). (5) The intervener has the right intent. (6) The intervener uses means to conduct the war that are consistent with its humanitarian aim. Much time and effort has been spent debating which of these criteria are morally important, why they are important, and what exactly they require. The preoccupation with Just War criteria has meant that two other factors in the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention have been, to some extent, overlooked. These two factors are more concerned with the views of those affected by intervention than their Just War counterparts, yet both significantly affect the legitimacy of an intervener. The first I shall describe as an intervener’s “internal representativeness.” This depends on whether an intervener’s decision making on the proposed intervention reflects the opinions of its citizens. For instance, the internal representativeness of the 1992 American intervention in Somalia turned on whether America represented the opinions of Americans. The second is what I shall describe as an intervener’s “external representativeness.” This depends on whether an intervener’s decision making on the proposed intervention reflects the opinions of those individuals in the political community that is subject to the intervention. To use the same example, the external representativeness of the 1992 American intervention in Somalia turned on whether America represented the opinions of Somalis. In this article, I make the case for the moral importance of these two factors that have been neglected in the literature to a certain extent. That is, I argue that an intervener’s legitimacy depends on whether it is representative of the opinions