Premium
The Informational Value of Incumbency
Author(s) -
BEVIÁ CARMEN,
LLAVADOR HUMBERTO
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01429.x
Subject(s) - exploit , argument (complex analysis) , value (mathematics) , economics , ideology , microeconomics , measure (data warehouse) , econometrics , political science , computer science , statistics , politics , law , mathematics , biology , computer security , biochemistry , database
This paper exploits the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from challengers. We propose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection success. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage, ideological bias, and terms in office. Our argument emphasizes that incumbency affects candidates' chances of winning even if they had no opportunity to strategically utilize policies.