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Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies
Author(s) -
FLEURBAEY MARC,
SPRUMONT YVES
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.01393.x
Subject(s) - egalitarianism , subsidy , public good , economics , microeconomics , axiom , context (archaeology) , welfare , social welfare , social welfare function , minimax , function (biology) , population , social cost , social preferences , public economics , market economy , mathematics , paleontology , geometry , demography , evolutionary biology , biology , sociology , politics , political science , law
We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population. We extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when cost shares cannot be negative, i.e., agents cannot receive subsidies from others. We adapt the Maniquet–Sprumont defense of public good welfare egalitarianism to this context. Weakening their Free Lunch Aversion axiom and adding a continuity requirement allows us to characterize the public good welfare maximin social ordering function.