Premium
Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Continuous‐Strategy Equilibria in the Private‐Information Subscription Game
Author(s) -
BARBIERI STEFANO,
MALUEG DAVID A.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00375.x
Subject(s) - incentive , private information retrieval , interim , economics , point (geometry) , public good , microeconomics , piecewise , mathematical economics , mathematics , mathematical analysis , statistics , geometry , archaeology , history
We reconsider Laussel and Palfrey's analysis of private provision of discrete public goods via the subscription game. We show their semi‐regular equilibria do not exist, casting doubt on their efficiency analysis. Taking players' values for the public good as uniformly distributed on , we exhibit previously unrecognized continuous equilibria—those with contribution strategies strictly increasing up to their maximum values, not necessarily equal to the provision cost, c , at which point they become flat. We show piecewise‐linear equilibria are not incentive efficient; and if and , then all symmetric equilibria are interim incentive inefficient.