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On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure‐Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent‐Seeking Contests
Author(s) -
YAMAZAKI TAKESHI
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00364.x
Subject(s) - contest , rent seeking , economics , microeconomics , nash equilibrium , uniqueness , strategy , mathematical economics , best response , symmetric equilibrium , equilibrium selection , game theory , repeated game , mathematics , politics , law , mathematical analysis , political science
Abstract There can be three types of heterogeneity among players in a rent‐seeking contest. First, effectiveness of player's effort on the winning probabilities may differ among players. Secondly, players may evaluate the rent or prize of the rent‐seeking contest differently. Thirdly, players may face different financial constraints. This article proves under standard assumptions in the literature that there exists a unique pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium in a general asymmetric rent‐seeking contest with these three types of heterogeneity among players.