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Endogenously Weighted Voting
Author(s) -
HOUY NICOLAS
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00346.x
Subject(s) - voting , axiom , anti plurality voting , cardinal voting systems , mathematical economics , economics , simple (philosophy) , approval voting , set (abstract data type) , microeconomics , econometrics , computer science , mathematics , political science , law , philosophy , geometry , epistemology , politics , programming language
We define Endogenously Weighted Plurality Voting (EWPV) as the voting rule that, each individual being allowed to cast exactly one vote, selects the individual(s) who obtain(s) the greatest number of indirect votes. Endogenously Weighted Approval Voting (EWAV) selects the individual(s) who obtain(s) the greatest number of indirect votes when each individual can cast as many votes as he wants. In both cases, each individual can vote for any other individual, i.e., the set of candidates is the set of voters. In this study, we give necessary and sufficient axioms for EWPV and EWAV. We also propose a simple model where EWAV is more efficient than the traditional Approval Voting.