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The Manipulability of Fair Solutions in Assignment of an Indivisible Object with Monetary Transfers
Author(s) -
FUJINAKA YUJI,
SAKAI TOYOTAKA
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00341.x
Subject(s) - equivalence (formal languages) , mathematical economics , object (grammar) , economics , set (abstract data type) , welfare , microeconomics , class (philosophy) , value (mathematics) , computer science , mathematics , discrete mathematics , market economy , artificial intelligence , machine learning , programming language
Public decision making often involves the problem of fairly assigning one indivisible object to agents with monetary transfers. An example is the choice of the location of a garbage incineration facility where the accepting district should receive fair compensations from other districts. In this problem, we show that for broad classes of solutions satisfying a welfare lower bound and an efficiency‐oriented condition, the set of equilibrium allocations in the manipulation game associated with a given solution coincides with the set of all envy‐free allocations. This generalizes Tadenuma and Thomson's equivalence result for a class of envy‐free solutions. Our result covers the Shapley value, which is not covered by Tadenuma and Thomson's result.