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On the Frequency of Interior Cournot – Nash Equilibria in a Public Good Economy
Author(s) -
BUCHHOLZ WOLFGANG,
CORNES RICHARD,
PETERS WOLFGANG
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00270.x
Subject(s) - cournot competition , economics , nash equilibrium , public good , simple (philosophy) , mathematical economics , microeconomics , population , set (abstract data type) , distribution (mathematics) , measure (data warehouse) , mathematics , computer science , mathematical analysis , database , philosophy , demography , epistemology , sociology , programming language
In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good in Cournot–Nash equilibrium. In this paper, first a simple formula is derived that provides a measure for the size of the set of income distributions leading to an interior Cournot–Nash equilibrium in which all individuals contribute to the public good. Furthermore, we give an estimate for the frequency that all members of a certain subgroup of the population are contributors.